Job Market Paper
A strategic analysis of "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money" (with Neil Wallace)
Abstract: “Expectations…”is the first counter-example to the view that a positive correlation between real output and the growth rate of the stock of money is exploitable. The equilibrium concept is competitive-equilibrium (CE). Here, two alternative strategic formulations—two versions of the market-game model—are applied. In one, the young make non-contingent offers of real saving; in the other, they make contingent offers, where the contingency is the realization of the two shocks in the model. Under the informational assumption that the young know nothing about current realizations, neither strategic formulation converges under replication to an equilibrium that exhibits the above positive correlation. Instead, they converge to other CE allocations.
Two-state Equilibria in an Economy with Randomly Alternating Endowments [draft coming soon]
Abstract: Coming soon.
Choosing Two Finalists and the Winner (with Levent Ülkü), Social Choice and Welfare, 2015
Abstract: We study a class of boundedly rational choice functions which operate as follows. The decision maker uses two criteria in two stages to make a choice. First, she shortlists the top two alternatives, i.e. two finalists, according to one criterion. Next, she chooses the winner in this binary shortlist using the second criterion. The criteria are linear orders that rank the alternatives. Only the winner is observable. We study the behavior exhibited by this choice procedure and provide an axiomatic characterization of it. We leave as an open question the characterization of a generalization to larger shortlists.
Work in Progress
Optimal monetary policy in a model with a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings (with Gaston Chaumont)
No-taxation optima in a random-matching model of money with discrete and bounded money holdings